Modelling the World: A Process-Ontological Approach

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1. A Process-Ontology

The most famous work of process philosophy is Alfred North Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, (1929). He believed that all events are related to one another and to the environments in which they occur. The world can best be understood as interrelated systems of larger and smaller events, some of which are relatively stable. Whitehead's metaphysics was also a philosophy of process. Events are always changing. Change represents the actualization of certain potentialities and the disappearances of others. The world does not simply exist, it is always becoming.

According to Whitehead, the world is a process which is the becoming of *actual entities* (or actual occasions). They endure only a short time, and they are processes of their own self creation. There are also *eternal objects* to be understood as conceptual objects. They enter into the actual entity becoming concrete without being actualities themselves. Although novel actual entities are progressively added to the world, there are no new eternal objects. They are the same for all actual entities.

However, we will not make any detour into Whitehead's "process philosophy" here. Nor will we make any study of the *Process of Reality*, such a complex and a difficult book as it is.[1] Instead of that we will just adopt an idea that everything consists of processes, and that these processes are divided into eternal processes interpreted as *concepts*, and actual processes, which we will interpret to be events occupying a finite amount of a four dimensional space-time. Thus, the world is constructed out of *events*. Every event in space-time is overlapped by other events, i.e., events are not impenetrable. A space-time order results from a relation between events. Also, in terms of events spatio-temporal point-instants, lines, surfaces, and regions can be defined by using the *Method of Extensive Abstraction* as follows, (see Russell 1927, Chapters XXVIII and XXIX, and Whitehead 1929, Part IV).

[1] For more recent study of process philosophy in this line of thought we refer to *After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics*, 2004, edited by Michael Weber.

A fundamental relation in construction of point-instants in a four dimensional space-time is a five-term relation of *co-punctuality*, which holds between five events having a common area to all of them. A set of five or more events is called *co-punctual* if every quintet chosen out of the set has the relation of co-punctuality. A *point-instant* is a co-punctual set which cannot be enlarged without ceasing to be a co-punctual. The existence of point-instant so defined is provided if all events can be well-ordered, i.e. if the Axiom of Choice is true, (cf. Russell 1927, 299).

Given two point-instants κ and λ, we denote by $\kappa\lambda$ their *logical product*, i.e., the events which are members of both. If $\kappa\lambda$ is non-empty, then κ and λ are said to be *connected*. A set of point-instants is defined to be *collinear*, if every pair of point-instants are connected, and every triad of point-instants α, β, γ are such that either $\alpha\beta$ is contained in γ, or $\alpha\gamma$ is contained in β. A set of point-instants is defined to be a *line*, if it is collinear, and it is not contained in any larger collinear set. The lines so defined are not supposed to be straight.

That definition of a line is analogous to that of a point-instant. It is possible to extend this method to obtain surfaces and regions, as well, (see Russell 1927, 311 *ff.*). A set of lines is called *co-superficial*, if any two lines intersect, i.e. they have a common point-instant, but there is no point common to all the lines of the set. A *surface* is a co-superficial set of lines which cannot be extended without ceasing to be co-superficial. A set of surfaces is called *co-regional*, if any two surfaces have a line in common, but no line is common to all the surfaces of the set. A *region* is a co-regional set of surfaces which cannot be extended without ceasing to be co-regional.

A *space-time order* is constructed out of the relation between events as follows. Two events are said to be *compresent* when they overlap in space-time. With respect to a given event it is possible to divide events into *zones* as follows: In the first zone there are those events that are compresent with a given event. Then, in the second zone, there are those events which are not compresent with a given event, but compresent with an event compresent with it, and so on. The nth zone will consist of events that can be reached in n steps, but not in n–1 steps, in which a step is taken to be as the passage from an event to another which is compresent with it. Assuming a minimum size of events, it is possible to pass from one event to another by a finite number of steps. Two point-instants are connected, if there is an event which is a member of both. Thus, point-instants can be collected into zones as well, and the passage from event to event by the relation of compresence can be replaced by the passage from point-instant to point-instant by the relation of connection. Accordingly, suppose there are n events, e_1, e_2, … , e_n, and suppose e_1 is compresent only with e_2, e_2 is compresent with e_1 and e_3, e_3 with e_2 and e_4, and so on. We can then construct the order e_1, e_2, … , e_n. The relation of connection is a causal relation between events, where the cause of an event occurs earlier than its effect.

We shall also distinguish events in a living brain from events elsewhere, (Russell 1948, 246). So thoughts should be among the events of which the brains consist, i.e., each region of the brain is a set of events. These events are called *mental events*. Mental events can be known without inferences and they consist of bundles of compresent qualities.

Events, which are not mental, are called *physical events*, and they, if known at all, are known only by inference so far as their space-time structure is concerned.

Accordingly, from the ontological point of view, everything consists of processes. Among processes, firstly, there are eternal processes and actual processes. Eternal processes are interpreted as concepts, whereas actual processes are interpreted as space-time events. Eternal processes are instantiated in actual processes. Secondly, among actual processes there are mental events and physical events. Mental events consist of bundles of compresent qualities which can be known without inferences, whereas physical events, if known, are known only by inference as regards to their space-time structure.

2. A Topological Model for a Process

We shall give a topological model for a process, in which events are interpreted as *open sets*, i.e., events will have a one-one correspondence with open sets. To get an idea, a few topological concepts are defined as follows. Consider a set T. Let $\{O_{i\in I}\}$ to be a set of open subsets of T satisfying the following axioms:

A1 The union of any number of open sets is an open set.
A2 The intersection of two open sets is an open set.
A3 T itself and the empty set $\varnothing$ are open sets.

A *topology* on a set T is then the specification of open subsets of T which satisfy these axioms, and this set T is called a *topological space*.

A set of open subsets $\{O_{i\in I}\}$ of T is said to be an *open covering* of T, if the union of $O_{i\in I}$ contains T. An open covering $\{V_{j\in I}\}$ of a space T is said to be a *refinement of an open covering* $\{O_{i\in I}\}$, if for each element V_j of $\{V_{j\in I}\}$ there is an element O_i of $\{O_{i\in I}\}$ such that $V_j \subseteq O_i$. If $\{O_{i\in I}\}$ is any open covering of T, and there is some finite subset $\{O_{i1}, O_{i2}, \dots, O_{in}\}$ of $\{O_{i\in I}\}$, then a space T is called a *compact*.

A topological space T is *separated*, if it is the union of two disjoint, non-empty open sets. A space T is *connected*, if it is not separated. A space T is said to be *path-connected* if for any two points x and y in T there exists a continuous function f from the unit interval $[0, 1]$ to T with $f(0) = x$ and $f(1) = y$. This function is called a *path* from x to y. A space T is *simply connected* if only if it is a path connected, and it has no "holes".[2] A space T, which is *connected,* but not simply connected, is called *multiply connected.*

[2] More formally, a path-connected space T is *simply connected* if given two points a and b in T and two paths $p : [0,1] \to T$ and $q : [0,1] \to T$ joining a and b, i.e., $p(0) = q(0) = a$ and $p(1) = q(1) = b$, there exists a homotopy in T between p and q. Two maps $p, q : X \to Y$ are said to be *homotopic* if there is a map $H : [0, 1] \times X \to Y$ such that for each point x in X, $H(0, x) = p(x)$ and $H(1, x) = q(x)$. The map H is called a *homotopy* between p and q. Intuitively, maps p and q are homotopic, if p can be continuously deformed to get q while keeping the endpoints fixed, and a path-connected space T is simply connected, if every closed path in T can be continuously deformed into a point.

Given two points a and b of a space T, a set $\{O_1, O_2, \ldots, O_n\}$ of open sets is a *simple chain from* a *to* b provided that O_1 (and only O_1) contains a, O_n (and only O_n) contains b, and $O_i \cap O_j$ is non-empty if and only if $|i - j| \leq 1$. That is, each link intersects just the one before it and the one after it, and, of course, itself. It can be proved that if a and b are two points of connected space T, and $\{O_{i \in I}\}$ is a set of open sets covering T, then there is a simple chain of elements of $\{O_{i \in I}\}$ from a to b, (for the proof, see the Theorem 3-4 in Hocking & Young, 1961). Moreover, let $C_1 = \{O_{11}, O_{12}, \ldots, O_{1n}\}$ and $C_2 = \{O_{21}, O_{22}, \ldots, O_{2m}\}$ be simple chains from a point a to a point b in a space T. The chain C_2 will be said to *go straight through* C_1 provided that i) every set O_{2i} is contained to some set O_{1j} and ii) if O_{2i} and O_{2k}, $i < k$, both lie in a set O_{1r}, then for every integer j, $i < j < k$, O_{2j} also lies in O_{1r}. Accordingly, the finer chain C_2 goes straight through the coarser chain C_1.

A topological model is used as follows: a process as a whole is interpreted as a topological space T, which, at least for empirical reasons, is compact and, depending on the number of parallel processes, is either a simply- or a multiply connected. The space T contains a start point a and an endpoint b of the process. The start point a is an event, which is included in the open set O_1, and, similarly, the endpoint b is an event, which is included in the open set O_n. The simple chain from a to b consists of sequences of events interpreted as a set $\{O_1, O_2, \ldots, O_n\}$ of open sets. Moreover, it is possible to get as coarse or as fine a chain from a to b as necessary. In a case there are parallel processes, i.e., processes which we want to keep distinct in a certain moment, for example feedbacks, we just add "holes" to our space T. This prevents the parallel processes from deforming to each other. The space T will then be multiply connected.

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